Agency and Virtues

Publish Year: 1398
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: Persian
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JR_PFK-21-81_008

تاریخ نمایه سازی: 7 خرداد 1399

Abstract:

Zahra khazaei*Received: 01/07/2019     |       Accepted: 11/09/2019In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally. This article studies the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and intention Or are virtues necessary merely for the moral or epistemic character of the agent and not his agency If virtues are constructive elements of personal identity, can we say that virtues are necessary for action and agency If we accept that virtues play a role in agency, the principle of Ought Implies Can makes us face a new challenge; which we will discuss. After explaining the concept of action and agency, I will study the relationship between agency and virtues in the field of ethics and epistemology. Ultimately, I conclude that not only in theories of virtue but also in other ethical theories, virtue is independently necessary for the actualization of agency; even if, conceptually, there might not be any relation between the two. In many cases, virtue can also have a crucial role in prudential agency. * Ph.D., Professor. Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.        ׀      Z-khazaei@qom.ac.ir khazaei. Z. (2019). Agency and Virtues. The Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(81), 119-140.  doi: 10.22091/jptr.2019.4673.2190.

Keywords:

Keywords: agency , action , moral virtue , epistemic virtue , the principle of Ought Implies Can

Authors

زهرا خزاعی

استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه قم

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