John Lemos - Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA

In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, ۲۰۱۸, Ch. ۵; ۲۰۲۱; ۲۰۲۳, Ch. ۶). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (۲۰۲۲) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.

free will, libertarianism, Indeterministic weightings, luck, John Lemos, Isthtiyaque Haji