The Optimal Model of Institutional Independence for Cyberspace Regulators in Iran: Comparative Lessons from Five Countries

The increasing expansion of cyberspace and rapid developments in digital technologies have confronted traditional regulatory systems with fundamental challenges. Institutional independence, as one of the most important components of modern regulatory systems, plays a vital role in the efficiency and effectiveness of these institutions. This research aims to design an optimal model of institutional independence for cyberspace regulators in Iran through a comparative study of five countries (United States, United Kingdom, Turkey, Japan, and China). The research methodology is qualitative with a multiple comparative case study strategy. Data collection was conducted through systematic document analysis including legal-statutory documents, organizational documents, and evaluation reports, with approximately ۲۰ key documents selected for each country using purposive sampling. Data analysis was performed through theoretical triangulation (structural-functional analysis, historical institutionalism, and sociological approach) using three-stage coding in MAXQDA software. The findings reveal a diverse spectrum of models ranging from liberal models with high institutional independence to centralized state control models. Key success factors in models with high independence include balanced governance structures, diverse financial resources, transparent decision-making processes, and multi-layered accountability mechanisms. For Iran, an intelligent combination of effective elements from global models adapted to the country's domestic conditions is proposed, which could provide the foundation for the formation of an efficient cyberspace regulatory system.

Keywords:

Institutional Independence , Cyberspace Regulation , Comparative Study , Digital Governance , Self-regulation