Cooperative and Competitive Game Analysis between Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in Management of the Arash (Al-Durra) Gas Field

The Arash (Al-Durra) gas field, located in the northern Persian Gulf, is a shared natural resource claimed by Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Ongoing maritime boundary disputes have made the development of this field a geopolitical and legal challenge. Game theory is used in this research to model the strategic interactions between the three states under various cooperation and competition scenarios. The results indicate that trilateral cooperation would be the greatest economic and security benefits for all parties; however, political tensions and legal barriers, particularly Iran’s non-membership in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), hinder such outcomes in the short term. Iran experiences the greatest losses under competitive strategies, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait benefit more from bilateral agreements. The study also explores how Iran’s legal position could be strengthened through accession to UNCLOS and the adoption of a flexible strategy that combines active diplomacy with cautious resource exploitation. This approach could improve Iran’s bargaining power and reduce its isolation in the dispute. The research offers a comprehensive analysis of the legal, geopolitical, and economic dimensions of the Arash field conflict and provides actionable policy recommendations to reduce tensions and promote equitable, long-term resource sharing in the region.

Keywords:

Arash Gas Field , game theory , Joint exploitation , Persian Gulf