Mehdi KHavaninzadeh - TAOC Tehran Regional Electric Company Tehran, Iran
Masoud Rashidinejad - Department of Electrical Engineering Shahid Bahonar University Kerman, Iran
Mohsen KHavaninzade - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering WTIAU Tehran, Iran

Participant of customers in electricity market can play an important role to improve the system reliability and also the market efficiency through the mitigation of spot price volatility. Up to now, this has come true for large consumers and the participation of small consumers in the market, is not yet justified Demand Response Exchange (DRX), is a market model that all customers with participating in this market competes with one another. They present amount of power that able to reduce and try to maximize its profits through best bidding strategies. This presents a two-level optimization problem in which customers try to maximize their profit with change their coefficient of bidding strategy and the market operator try to minimize network cost. In this paper we used game theory framework with a dynamic Nash Equilibrium (NE) and supply function equilibrium (SFE) model for modeling competitions among customers in DRX market model. A non-cooperative game with complete information is assumed, and a nine-bus system is employed to illustrate the proposed method.

Power system markets; Demand Response Programs; DRX, Bidding strategy; SFE; Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium;