Comparison of the prevalence and control of avian influenza between Asia and Europe and America

Introduction:Avian influenza, listed by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), has become a disease of great importance for animal and human health. Several aspects of the disease lack scientific information, which has hampered the management of some recent crises. Millions of animals have died, and concern is growing over the loss of human lives and management of the pandemic potential. On the basis of data generated in recent outbreaks and in light of new OIE regulations and maintenance of animal welfare, we review the available control methods for avian influenza infections in poultry, from stamping out to prevention through emergency and prophylactic vaccination. In this study, we study the outbreak of avian influenza and its management and control in different continents.The Avian Influenza Coordinated Agriculture Project (AICAP) entitled Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza in the US strives to be a significant point of reference for the poultry industry and the general public in matters related to the biology, risks associated with, and the methods used to prevent and control avian influenza. To this end, AICAP has been remarkably successful in generating research data, publications through an extensive network of university- and agency-based researchers, and extending findings to stakeholders. The long-term goal of the USDA-Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service National Research Initiative-funded program entitled Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza in the US (Avian Influenza Coordinated Agriculture Project, AICAP) is to serve as a significant point of reference for the poultry industry and the general public in matters related to the biology, risks associated with, and the methods used to prevent and control avian influenza . This integrated project, which includes projects addressing viral pathogenesis in domestic poultry species, the development of diagnostic tests and vaccines, especially those technologies that support differentiation of infectious from vaccinated animal strategies, surveillance, and outreach to stakeholder groups was initially funded through a competitive process in 2004. From 2005 to 2007, the AICAP network has tested samples from more than 23,000 free-flying birds in every flyway in the United States .. Because of the stability of the virus in the environment and highly contagious nature, strict biosecurity measures and good hygiene are essential in protecting against disease outbreaks. keep poultry away from areas frequented by wild fowl;• do not keep on the premises elements that may attract wild birds, including poultry feed products placed outside the building;• maintain strict control over access to flocks by vehicles, people and equipment;• ensure the sanitation of property, poultry houses and equipment;• avoid the introduction of birds of unknown disease status into the flock;• report any bird illnesses and deaths to the Veterinary Services;• ensure appropriate disposal of manure, litter and dead poultry;35• vaccinate animals where appropriateIf the infection is detected in animals, a policy of culling infected and contact animas is normally used in an effort to rapidly contain, control and eradicate the disease.Requirements include• humane destruction of all infected and exposed animals (according to OIE animal welfare standards);• appropriate disposal of carcasses, litter and all animal products;• surveillance and tracing of potentially infected or exposed poultry;• strict quarantine and controls on movement of poultry and any potentially contaminated vehicles and personnel;• thorough cleaning and decontamination of infected premises;• a period of at least 21 days before restocking.The United States federal government maintains a stockpile – vaccines, including vaccine against Asian H5N1 and Asian H7N9 viruses . The stockpiled vaccines could be used if similar viruses were to begin transmitting easily from person to person. Since influenza viruses change, CDC continues to make candidate vaccine viruses as needed. Creating a candidate vaccine virus is the first step in producing a vaccine.Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) A(H5N8) in domestic poultry and wild birds in Europe in 2014 have some similarities to the previous introduction of HPAIV A(H5N1). Since beginning of November 2014, nine outbreaks have been detected in four countries in Europe. Comparisons between these incursions may help to better understand potential risks to public health.The Australian and Queensland governments understand the importance of protecting our poultry industry. Primary producers, relevant government bodies and the public are alerted to disease events overseas and of the appropriate preventive action. Measures taken for avian influenza include:• banning the importation of live poultry, aviary birds and eggs into Australia from countries that have avian influenza• inspection, quarantine and testing of poultry products (meat and/or egg products and products including feathers) and live birds at airports, seaports and international mail handling facilities• investigation of reported suspect infection in birds or poultry by Biosecurity Queensland veterinary officers and inspectors• Biosecurity Queensland laboratories routinely screening all bird samples submitted for examination.The Asian Development Bank (ADB) carried out the Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza in Asia and the Pacific Project as part of an international effort to respond to the outbreak of avian influenza during 2005-2010 and to prepare for a potential human influenza pandemic. The project’s intended impact was a reduction in the social and economic disruption caused by avian and human influenza outbreaks in Asia and the Pacific. The intended outcomes of the project were the containment of infection by avian influenza H5N1 at source, and enhancement of36preparedness for a potential human influenza pandemic in the region. The project’s targeted outputs were grouped under four components. The first related to regional capacity building and comprised the strengthening of national capacities to contain avian influenza outbreaks, and to prevent human influenza and prepare for a potential human influenza pandemic. Intended outputs under component 2, which involved regional coordination in addressing the problem, were improvement of coordination between affected countries and technical agencies in a regular exchange of epidemiological information, laboratory specimens, and supplies; the creation of rapid regional field response and containment capacity; and the enhancement of risk communication efforts. Component 3 involved the establishment of the Avian Influenza Response Facility and a flexible, fastdisbursing mechanism to address the demands that an evolving and uncertain avian influenza epidemic would create. The output under component 4, which involved project administration, was to be the development of capacity to administer an investment project with a number of different implementing agencies. The project helped establish a regional coordination mechanism unit at the ASEAN Secretariat that provides multisector collaboration and oversight on issues related to transboundary transmission of animal diseases, zoonoses, and other EIDs. The project was also consistent with ADB’s Regional Cooperation and Integration Strategy, since fighting the avian influenza and other emerging infectious diseases is a regional public good. 11 It was well designed to deliver its intended impacts, with two of the project components focusing on long-term development and the third enabling rapid mobilization of emergency funding through the AIREF to fill gaps or meet urgent needs in the work to contain outbreaks. The project required a multifaceted approach and combined immediate interventions, such as improving laboratory and health-related communication infrastructure, with capacity building and reforms in the health systems to better integrate surveillance, prevention, and follow-up. ADB should sustain a dialogue with technical and regional organizations on the further development of regional surveillance and laboratory networks and on a timely information flow between sectors to provide early warning of EIDs and other health security threats. ADB should always keep in mind the potential adverse impact that health security threats have on economic development. WHO’s innovative proposal in APSED in 2010 to establish a regional indicatorbased surveillance system for priority diseases may be useful in this regard. ADB should continue to leverage its comparative advantages at the regional level, including its proven convening power and role as an honest broker, to support the multisector and multidisciplinary responses that are essential for strengthening health security in the region. ADB should meet the challenge of sustaining the momentum in the strengthening of regional health security by committing to longer-term support, focusing on a more sustainable approach to preparedness. Further broadening of partnerships, including the engagement of the private sector, should be an essential part of fostering regional health security .Conclusion:Prevention, control and eradication are three different goals or outcomes for dealing with avian influenza outbreaks in commercial poultry of the USA. These goals are achieved through various strategies developed using components of biosecurity (prevention or reduction in exposure), surveillance and diagnostics, elimination of infected poultry, decreasing host susceptibility to the virus (vaccination or host genetics) and education. However, the success of any developed37strategy has depended on industry-government trust, co-operation and interaction. The preferred outcome for HPAI has been stamping out, for which the federal government has regulatory authority to declare an emergency and do immediate eradication of HPAI, and pay indemnities. For H5and H7LPAI, strategies vary from an immediate control plan followed by an intermediate to long-term strategy of eradication. The state governments have regulatory authority over H5 and H7 LPAI, but work cooperatively with USDA in joint programmes. Stamping out has been occasionally used as has controlled marketing, but inconsistently, indemnities have been funded by the state governments and the poultry industries, and less frequently by USDA. Vaccines have been occasionally used but require USDA license of the vaccine and approval from both state and federal government before use in the field. Non-H5 and -H7 LPAI generally follow a preventive programme, such as H1N1 swine-influenza vaccination for turkey breeders. In other situations, control and eradication strategies are followed but regulatory authority is lacking for USDA. Most programmes for LPAI are voluntary and industry-driven.

Keywords:

avian influenza , prevalence , control