A Decision Analysis Approach to Multilateral Negotiations

The main objective of this research is to develop a formal methodology for the modeling and analysis of multilateral negotiations in which all possible outcomes are known a priori. In this form of negotiation, therefore, the agreement reached must be one of several prespecified alternatives. The fact that the set of possible agreements is discrete, and specified in advance, makes the negotiation problems considered here distinctive. Each decision maker has two concerns: first, achieving an alternative that is as preferable as possible; second, building support for this alternative among the other decision makers. In summary, this paper focuses on a systeatic investigation of multilateral negotiations with the following general characteristics:• Decision makers in the negotiation are seeking a resolution that is not only feasible but also stable (enduring). Of course, each negotiator tries to attain the most preferable agreement for himself or herself.• If an agreement is reached, it must be an alternative from a prespecified list, and all decision makers must accept the agreement.• Decision makers can possess different levels of power (or legitimacy) in support of an agreement, so the negotiation is not necessarily symmetric. [2] Moreover, the analysis makes use only of the decision makers’ preference orders over the proposed alternatives, and does not require cardinal representations of their preferences.During the past few decades, researchers have proposed different assumptions and principles to formulate concepts and models of the negotiation process. One common classification of models is as normative, descriptive or prescriptive. [1] However, this categorization is not exclusive, and one cannot necessarily ascribe a given model or methodology to only one category. The methodology proposed in this research is mostly descriptive.