Cartelized Oil Market with Alternative Energy Supply
Publish place: Iranian Economic Review Journal، Vol: 1، Issue: 1
Publish Year: 1373
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: English
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شناسه ملی سند علمی:
JR_IER-1-1_002
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 21 مهر 1402
Abstract:
This paper presents an oil price cartel model. The aggregate reaction functions for non-cartel producers and for substitute suppliers are included. The former group acts as a price-taker, while the latter expects oil prices in production of its non-oil energy resources. This expectation about prices affects a cartel’s oil demand and, thus, gives intertemporal price elasticities It turns out that if these elasticities are positive, Hotelling’s rule does not apply to a cartelized market in which a cartel behaves as a price-maker.