A novel hybrid multi-stage framework for non‐cooperative game theory based energy management systems in neighborhood smart grids among distributed energy resources uncertainties
Publish place: Ninth International Conference on Technology Development in Iranian Electrical Engineering
Publish Year: 1403
نوع سند: مقاله کنفرانسی
زبان: English
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شناسه ملی سند علمی:
ECMCONF09_042
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 15 مرداد 1403
Abstract:
This Competition among distributed generation (DG) sources in the smart grids for obtaining higher profit is one of the topics noticed by researchers during the recent years. For reaching this goal, the DGs existing in the grid can cooperate with each other and also with the DGs of other grids for obtaining higher profit and can form coalition for reaching this propose. Fair profit allocation resulting from the coalition among DGs can be considered an important criterion for showing the improvement of the efficiency of smart grids. In this paper, a methodology with two level structure for maximizing profit in a competitive market and also allocating profit resulting from coalition formation among several grids which also each one has separated DGs; has been presented. At the initial level of the suggested structure, a mechanism based on the non-cooperative game theory structure has been presented and its goal is the implementation of competitive market and also the study of energy supply strategies based on pricing mechanism by the multiple supplying energy sources. A new criterion called the efficiency of the symmetric Nash equilibrium has been introduced for showing the effect of increase of the number of DGs in each grid. Furthermore, for allocating the profit resulting from coalition formation among the members at secondary level algorithms called Shapley, Nucleolus and Merge and Split have been implemented and the results obtained from them have been compared with each other. It has been shown that because of the lack of communication among the DGs for obtaining the pricing decisions, they can cooperated with each other by increasing the gathering of their facilities for obtaining higher profit and preventing the payment of the cost resulting from excess generation and or less than the limit determined. As a result of this cooperation, the payoff of each one of them has also increased subsequently.
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Authors
Milad moafi
Mazandaran Electric Power Distribution Company
Ahmad khalili
Mazandaran Electric Power Distribution Company