Two Aspect Reading of Kant’s Thing in Itself

We cannot evaluate Kant's critical project without considering Transcendental Idealism, as it provides his solution to the enduring problem of metaphysics. Kant views transcendental idealism as a means through which metaphysics can follow 'the secure course of a science' (Bxiv), while also 'removing an obstacle that limits' (Bxxv) practical reason. The most contentious element of his proposal is his classification of empirical objects as appearances rather than things in themselves. This distinction restricts our knowledge to things as they appear, leaving their true nature beyond our cognitive grasp. In this article, I will explore Kant's concept of the 'thing in itself' and examine whether Allison's two-aspect interpretation is a valid representation of Kant's theory and if it effectively resolves its issues. The first part of this article will focus on Allison's two-aspect reading of the 'thing in itself' and his solutions to its paradoxes. The second part will address three objections raised by Guyer, who critiques Allison’s reading from a two-object perspective, and Kant's main argument in the Aesthetic. Lastly, I will evaluate the internal consistency of Allison’s interpretation and its alignment with Kant’s texts. I will conclude by demonstrating that, although (۱) Allison consistently counters Guyer’s objections and (۲) his interpretation captures the overall intent of Kant’s project, (۳) it is not entirely consistent with Kant’s writings.

Keywords:

Kant , Thing in itself , Henry Allison , transcendental idealism , refutation of idealism