A comparative Study of the Theorical Foundations of Regional Taxation in Countries with Oil and Gas Resources

This study aims to examine and compare the theoretical foundations of regional taxation in countries with rich oil and gas resources, and has selected Iran and Russia as case studies. The importance of this issue stems from the fact that the strong dependence of government budgets on oil and gas revenues directly affects the structure and functioning of the tax system and brings challenges such as severe revenue fluctuations, reduced financial sustainability, and weaknesses in balanced regional development. In this study, the impact of economic theories, including the principles of fiscal federalism and resource rent tax models, on the design and implementation of tax systems in resource-dependent regions has been examined. In order to achieve this goal, a qualitative research approach and a comparative study method have been used, and data have been collected through the analysis of official documents and reports. The findings show that while both countries use centralized tax frameworks based on the theory of resource rent, the regional tax policy structure in Russia, with its stronger elements of fiscal federalism, has allowed for a larger share of resource revenues to be retained at the local level. In contrast, the Iranian tax system is more based on the complete concentration of revenues at the national level, which significantly limits the fiscal autonomy of the regions. A comparison of the two countries indicates that differences in the degree of delegation of tax powers, methods of revenue sharing, and the level of diversification of revenue sources have led to significant differences in the economic development potential of the regions. These results emphasize the need to review regional tax policies in Iran with the aim of increasing revenue sustainability and strengthening regional justice.

Keywords:

Regional taxation , fiscal federalism , resource rent , Iran , Russia , oil and gas policy