FACTORS AFFECTING SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG ECONOMIC ELITES IN THE PAST THREE DECADES

Elaheh Sadat Badri
Khalil Mirzaei
Afsaneh Varasteh Far

Abstract
The present study was conducted to determine the trend of social mobility among economic elites over the past three decades. The method is descriptive. The statistical population consists of economic elites in Tehran (approximately 100,000 people). Based on Morgan's table, a sample size of 384 individuals was selected through systematic random sampling. A researcher-made questionnaire was used, with validity determined through content and construct validity, and reliability through Cronbach's alpha. One-way ANOVA and path analysis were used for data analysis. Results indicate that social mobility differs across the three decades of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s in terms of vertical, horizontal, and geographical mobility. Horizontal and geographical mobility show significant differences across these decades. Economic elites experienced the most social mobility in the 2010s and the least in the 2000s. In the 2010s, 97.9% had no desire to leave the country, indicating no inclination towards geographical mobility, while tending towards horizontal mobility. Path analysis revealed that family ranks first (total effect 0.291), economic knowledge second (0.254), media third (inverse -0.164), social intelligence fourth (0.163), gender attitude fifth (inverse -0.153), verbal communication sixth (inverse -0.098), creativity seventh (0.090), and politics eighth (inverse -0.077).

Keywords: Social Mobility, Economic Elites, Past Three Decades

Introduction and Statement of the Problem
Various approaches explain social mobility. Some attribute it to social structures (economic Marxists, structural Marxists, critical theorists), while others emphasize cultural values, attitudes, and individual skills, viewing the lack of developmental norms as the main cause of low mobility (Lerner, 2004). Marx focused on structural and economic dimensions, while Weber stressed cultural factors and religion's role in capitalist development (Weber, 2013).

Sorokin defined social mobility as individual movement within social space, distinguishing between economic, occupational, and political stratifications (Sorokin, 1964). He identified horizontal mobility (movement between equivalent positions, e.g., migration, job changes) and vertical mobility (moving between strata, rising or falling). He believed even rigid systems offer advancement possibilities, while open systems still face obstacles (Nik Gohar, 2008). Mobility among elites is crucial; its absence leads to declining ideas, reduced efficiency, and delayed economic growth.

Elites exist in every social sphere: scientific, economic, political, etc. (Ansari, 2001). An elite is a distinguished individual whose intelligence, creativity, and innovation accelerate scientific and balanced development. When technologies are sanctioned, supporting elites can transform them into commercial activities—a key feature of a resistance economy (Asghari, 2012).

Economic elites include managers and experts in governmental or private economic institutions, often educated and working in central banks, oil companies, private banks, or insurance. In open societies, individuals ascend based on talent and merit. High mobility chances foster stability (Weakliem, 1992), while obstacles to upward mobility lead to political crisis and reduced legitimacy (Rafipour, 1997).

Key studies on elite mobility include Mills' The Power Elite (1956), showing that America's power elite share similar backgrounds and interests, with mobility restricted to a specific group (Mills, 2009). Domhoff (2005) demonstrated the upper class's presence across multiple domains. Bourdieu analyzed how various forms of capital reproduce top positions (Momtaz, 2004). In Iran, Zonis (2018) studied Pahlavi-era political officials, revealing interpersonal relationships as central to Iranian politics. Nadimi (2011) examined job mobility among Iranian political officials, showing fundamental changes in 1989. Foreman-Peck (2004) found that business stimulated elite mobility in Victorian-England, with capital availability being key.

Social mobility facilitates democracy by redistributing resources, reducing conflict, and decreasing coup likelihood. Even in authoritarian systems, it stabilizes governance by reducing mass movements (Nadimi, 2011). Thus, this research asks: What is the trend of social mobility among economic elites in the past three decades, and what factors influence it?

Research Background
Kazemipour (1999) found Tehran's social mobility averages one class per individual relative to their father, with 40% experiencing downward mobility. Key factors included geographical origin, education, occupational prestige, and class position. Moghaddas (1995) showed that in Shiraz and Yasuj, organizational power and capital were crucial for class mobility, with inheritance patterns, high birth rates, and economic instability also playing roles.

Sorokin (1927) studied various societies, finding America's rapid upward mobility opportunities more limited than folklore suggested (Giddens, 2004). Blau and Duncan (1978) found vertical mobility in America high but occurring between closely related positions, with long-range mobility rare. Recent studies emphasize cultural factors, with education's mediating role in intergenerational mobility attracting attention (Marshall et al., 1997; Erikson & Jonsson, 1998). Goldthorpe (2000) concluded that social classes maintain their position by directing children toward specific academic fields (Werfhorst, 2002). Payne and Roberts (2002) found that England provided more mobility opportunities for men between 1972-1992, with this trend slowing in the mid-1990s.

Theoretical Framework
Weber emphasized that the Protestant ethic, with its cultural characteristics and religious beliefs presenting work as a duty, was crucial for industrial and capitalist progress (Weber, 2013). Oscar Lewis described hopelessness as a feature of poverty culture, where children absorb values preventing them from seizing opportunities (Lewis, 1974). Parsons (1958) spoke of those who prioritize freedom over adaptation, even at the cost of poverty. Merton (1959) noted that maladjusted family members neither understand societal goals nor the means to achieve them.

The psychological modernization school emphasizes cultural and psychological factors. Hagen (1962) viewed cultural personality as the main factor in economic development. Lerner (1958) described the mobile personality as having high adaptive capacity, equipped with mechanisms of projection and introjection to integrate new demands. Proponents believe that those with intellectual abilities, problem-solving skills, knowledge, creativity, innovation, and social skills can achieve upward mobility (McClelland, 1951; Lerner, 1958; Hagen, 1962).

Research Methodology
This descriptive research employed a researcher-made questionnaire with 36 items. Validity was assessed through content (CVR) and construct validity (KMO), and reliability through Cronbach's alpha. The statistical population comprised economic elites in Tehran (approximately 100,000). Using Morgan's table, 384 individuals were selected through systematic random sampling (one per 260). One-way ANOVA and path analysis (using simultaneous regression) were used for data analysis.

Research Findings
Section One: Social Mobility Across Three Decades
Horizontal and geographical mobility show significant differences across the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Horizontal mobility ranked highest in the 2010s, followed by the 1990s, then the 2000s. Economic elites experienced most mobility in the 2010s and least in the 2000s. Geographical mobility also ranked highest in the 2010s, with 97.9% indicating no desire to leave Iran, showing a clear tendency toward horizontal rather than geographical mobility.

Section Two: Path Analysis Results
Based on calculated direct and indirect effects from regression analyses, the total effects of independent variables on social mobility are:

• Family: 0.291 (Rank 1)
• Economic Knowledge: 0.254 (Rank 2)
• Media: -0.164 (Rank 3, inverse)
• Social Intelligence: 0.163 (Rank 4)
• Gender Attitude: -0.153 (Rank 5, inverse)
• Verbal Communication: -0.098 (Rank 6, inverse)
• Creativity: 0.090 (Rank 7)
• Politics: -0.077 (Rank 8, inverse)

Discussion and Conclusion
The results show that most social mobility occurred in the 2010s, with upward and downward movements nearly equal. Geographical mobility was minimal, with elites preferring to upgrade current activities rather than change jobs or leave Iran. The tendency toward horizontal and vertical mobility can benefit societal development, though economic instability may hinder this process. The fact that over half of elites experienced positive mobility in the last decade indicates adaptation to current conditions.

A significant positive relationship exists between economic knowledge, family, social intelligence, creativity and social mobility. Path analysis revealed family as the primary factor, followed by economic knowledge, intelligence, and creativity. This aligns with Masoumi Rad and Nayebi (2013) on education's importance, and McClelland (1951), Lerner (1958), and Hagen (1962) on intellectual abilities and skills enabling upward mobility.

Conversely, media, gender attitude, and politics show significant inverse relationships with social mobility. Path analysis identified media as having the strongest negative impact, followed by gender attitude, verbal communication, and politics. This indicates that negative media propaganda, gender discrimination in economic development, and misguided policies have reduced mobility among elites. As Mirzaei (2015: 434) states, equal opportunities enable high mobility, while unequal opportunities and ascription processes result in low mobility.

Elite social mobility depends on economic knowledge and education, family position and support, high social intelligence, creativity in economic activity, appropriate media representation, correct gender attitudes, and sound policymaking. Politics had a negative impact, ranking last among factors. The participating elites showed no desire for geographical mobility, preferring horizontal mobility within Iran. Upward and downward vertical mobility were equal, reflecting broader economic conditions. Most social mobility across all types occurred in the 2010s.