A Critical Review of John Mackie's Error Theory

John Mackie’s viewpoint in meta-ethics is known as error theory, based on which the moral claims, in general, are exposed to errors. Mackie relies on two arguments, one of which is based on relativity and the other is based on queerness. In the first argument, he resorts to the diversity of laws and rituals in different societies. In the second one, which consists of two epistemological and metaphysical subclasses and is considered to be more important with more general usage, he argues that the objectivity of the morals in the world requires our exposure to absurd phenomena. He concludes that claiming the existence of the objective values in the world doesn't mean the utterance of a meaningless claim, yet it is completely wrong and false. Accordingly, issues such as duty, merit, virtue, and moral justification are all useless and meaningless. His viewpoint has been the object of several criticisms, some instances of which include: the scope of the realities of the things embraces the ethical values as well; difference and diversity don't require the morals to be unreal; the valued objectivity and scientific objectivity must be discriminated; it should be known that the ethical attributes can be achieved as the consequences of natural features; and the necessity of the objectivity of a concept doesn't mean that it should have an objective equivalent in our world. John Mackie's viewpoint does not seem to be the solution to the opposition and conflict between realism and anti-realism.

Keywords:

Error Theory , Realism , anti-realism , Ethical values , ethical rules