The Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will

This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will (LFW). It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe (۲۰۰۵, ۲۰۰۸) and John Lemos (۲۰۱۸, Ch.۵) has the resources to answer such luck objections while possessing virtues which some other libertarian views lack. According to the indeterministic weightings model of LFW, in making undetermined free-willed choices between two courses of action, A or B, the reasons for choosing each option don’t come with pre-established evaluative weights. During the process of deliberation, the agent assigns weight in an undetermined way to the reasons for each option and this typically leads to the choice of the option that has been assigned a greater value. In the paper, it is not only argued that this theory can resolve worries about luck but also that the view has virtues which certain other libertarian views lack, as such the view is contrasted with the modest libertarian models of LFW from Daniel Dennett (۱۹۷۸) and Alfred Mele (۱۹۹۵) as well as Robert Kane’s view (۱۹۹۶, ۲۰۰۲, ۲۰۰۷, ۲۰۱۱, ۲۰۱۹).

Keywords:

free will , moral responsibility , libertarianism , luck