Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Wage-Rise Contracts as Strategic Device
Publish place: International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics (IJMAE)، Vol: 7، Issue: 7
Publish Year: 1399
Type: Journal paper
Language: English
View: 123
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Document National Code:
JR_IJMAE-7-7_002
Index date: 1 November 2023
Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Wage-Rise Contracts as Strategic Device abstract
This paper considers a mixed duopoly market in which a private firm competes against a public firm. Each firm first has to choose the timing for offering a wage-rise contract as a strategic device. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm chooses either stage two or stage three simultaneously and independently. In stage two, the firm choosing stage two offers a wage-rise contract in this stage. In stage three, the firm choosing stage three offers a wage-rise contract in this stage. At the end of the game, each firm chooses its actual output simultaneously and independently. The paper studies the behavior of the public firm and the private firm in the mixed duopoly model. The aim of this paper is to present the equilibrium outcome of the mixed duopoly model.
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Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Wage-Rise Contracts as Strategic Device authors
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan
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