Earnings Management in Delisted Companies: Case of Iran

Over three years of 2007 to 2009 one hundred eight companies delisted from the Iranian financial market which forms about one third of total companies continuously listed in the same period. This paper investigates earnings management (EM) statue in relation to firm characteristics such as leverage, size and ROA in a sample of thesecompanies. Voluntary disclosure about state of corporate governance is also included in the analysis. Results from financial reports of one and twoyears before delisting indicate that managers are extensively managing their earnings. Further inquiry reveals that while numbers of delisted companies that manage their earnings upward or downward are equal, in companies with negative EM profitability exhibit strong statistical relation with DACC (proxy for EM). Inquiries about corporate governance indicate that five directors (board size) on board of directors is common (68 from 73 firms reported 5 members). The mean number of independent board members is more than 3 directors, and institutional ownership is widespread that 79.5% of firms reported more than 50% of such shares

Keywords:

Iran earnings management , delisted companies , distressed companies , firm characteristics