Hafez’s Approach towards the Problem of Moral Judgment

This paper studies the approach of Hafez towards the problem of moral judgment, according to current ethical terms. It is shown that Hafez‟s verses confirm a moral approach in normative ethics, which can be identified as virtue-based ethics. This approach is opposed to deontologism and consequentialism, and it emphasizes on the virtues, or moral character. In moral judgment, one should theoretically consider moral character instead of rules, duties or consequences of actions. The paper discusses that the Hafez‟s virtue ethics approach, in itself, makes moral judgment practically impossible or very difficult; and avoids moral judgment, at least, for three reasons: a) the problem of moral judgment is an epistemological gap; b) the purpose of morality is to act correctly, which opposes moral judgment. Hence, according to Hafez, self-purification is prior to attempt to enjoin others; c) human life is totally under domination of fatality.

Hafez’s Approach towards the Problem of Moral Judgment Keywords:

Tugendethik , moralisches Urteilsvermögen , erkenntnistheoretische Lücke , Fairness , Fatalismus