Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-brain Relationship Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise

U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.

Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-brain Relationship Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise Keywords:

mind , brain , identity , analytic and synthetic , a posteriori necessity , internalism , externalism