Quine on Charity and Rationality

Publish Year: 1399
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: English
View: 175

This Paper With 14 Page And PDF Format Ready To Download

  • Certificate
  • من نویسنده این مقاله هستم

استخراج به نرم افزارهای پژوهشی:

لینک ثابت به این Paper:

شناسه ملی سند علمی:

JR_PHILO-14-32_011

تاریخ نمایه سازی: 20 مرداد 1400

Abstract:

W. V. Quine borrows the principle of charity from Neil Wilson, but modifies and enriches its content to fit into his naturalistic philosophy and epistemology. While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible. According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the principles of psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection, which Quine uses in the contexts akin to that of the principle of charity, are not but different terms for one basic idea. Given the ties between the principle of charity and rationality, Quine's wide use of the principle and its affiliated notions proves that rationality is a central, often neglected, idea in his philosophy. The paper begins with an introductory account of the brief explanation Wilson gives of the principle of charity. Then it spells out four concepts or principles of charity, psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection showing how these four notions or principles basically express the same thing. Examining the relation of these last three principles with the principle of charity and rationality, the paper's main objective is to highlight the centrality of common rationality in Quine's philosophy, despite the common view that Quine is purely engaged with semantical aspects of Language. 

Keywords:

Authors

حمیدرضا محبوبی آرانی

استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران

مجتبی درایتی

دکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

مراجع و منابع این Paper:

لیست زیر مراجع و منابع استفاده شده در این Paper را نمایش می دهد. این مراجع به صورت کاملا ماشینی و بر اساس هوش مصنوعی استخراج شده اند و لذا ممکن است دارای اشکالاتی باشند که به مرور زمان دقت استخراج این محتوا افزایش می یابد. مراجعی که مقالات مربوط به آنها در سیویلیکا نمایه شده و پیدا شده اند، به خود Paper لینک شده اند :
  • Barrett, Robert B & Gibson, Roger F. (eds.) )۱۹۹۰(, Perspectives ...
  • Davidson, Donald, )۱۹۹۰(, “Meaning, Truth and Evidence” in Barrett & ...
  • Dennett, Daniel C. )۱۹۸۷(, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The ...
  • Grandy, Richard )۱۹۷۳(, “Reference, Meaning and Belief” in Journal of ...
  • Harman, Gilbert )۱۹۹۰(, “Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to the Theory ...
  • Hylton, Peter )۲۰۰۷(, Quine, New York & London: Routledge.. ...
  • Quine, W. V. )۱۹۵۹(, “Meaning and Translation”, in Brower, Reuben ...
  • Quine, W. V. )۱۹۶۰(, Word and Object, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The ...
  • Quine, W. V. )۱۹۶۹ª(, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New ...
  • Quine, W. V. )۱۹۶۹b(, “Replies” in Davidson, Donald & Hintikka, ...
  • Quine, W. V. )۱۹۸۰(, From a Logical Point of View: ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۸۶), Philosophy of Logic, second edition, Cambridge, ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۹۰a), “Three Indeterminacies” in W.V. Quine (۲۰۰۸), ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۹۰b), “Comment on Harman” in Barrett & ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۹۰c), “Comment on Parsons” in Barrett & ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۹۲), Pursuit of Truth, Harvard University Press.. ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۹۳), “Where Do We Disagree?” in Hahn, ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۱۹۹۵), From Stimulus to Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts: ...
  • Quine, W. V. (۲۰۰۴), Progress on Two Fronts, in Quine, ...
  • Rosenberg, Alex (۲۰۰۰), Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction, second ...
  • Sundholm, Göran (۱۹۸۴), “Brouwer's Anticipation of the Principle of Charity”, ...
  • Wilson, N. L. (۱۹۵۹), “Substances without Substrata” in The Review ...
  • Wilson, N. L. (۱۹۷۰), “Grice on Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-Example” ...
  • نمایش کامل مراجع