Decision-Making and Collective Choice against Terrorism in the UNSC

Decisions as outputs of international organizations are highly influenced by different motivations. Presence of veto powers, heterogeneity of preferences and the rules governing decisions lead to study the decision-making in the United Nations Security Council. But the main puzzle of the current paper is to discover the motivations influencing on decision-making in the UNSC. According to our research, precedent and organizational doctrines guide the veto holders’ decisions. The costs of unilateral decisions push the members of UNSC to act based on collective bargaining and decisions which not only modify the opportunity structures but also help them to meet their rather different preferences. One of the most notable cases that these double doctrines are heavily visible in the UNSC activity is the area of the terrorism. In this case, the UNSC as an international political organization providing collective response to the international security threats by resorting to agreed language and political coalition.

Keywords:

International Organizations , Decision-making , UNSC , collective action , terrorism