Kant and the Relationship Between the Fact of Reason and The Deduction of Moral Principles

Kant divides judgments into four classes (synthetic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, analytic a priori, analytic a posteriori) and considers the first three classes as possible. However, the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments requires justification because these judgments are not justified as necessary and universal judgments by mere analysis of concepts - as opposed to analytic a priori judgments - or by reference to experience - as opposed to synthetic a posteriori judgment. In his critical system, Kant attempts to justify the validity of this kind of judgment by a "legal" process called "deduction," and he does this for both theoretical and practical judgments. But about practical judgments, he uses a doctrine called "the fact of reason", which implies direct awareness of moral principles and moral consciousness in general. However, the role of this doctrine in justifying synthetic a priori judgments has been disputed by commentators, some of whom have seen Kant's proposal of this doctrine as a retreat from the deduction of moral principles. In contrast, this article shows that Kant does not avoid the deduction of moral principles, but that this doctrine is part of the process of 'deducing' these judgments as a legal process.

Kant and the Relationship Between the Fact of Reason and The Deduction of Moral Principles Keywords:

Kant , Moral Law , Deduction , fact of reason , synthetic a priori , Critique of Practical Reason