Power Distribution, Political Regime, and Economic Institutions
Publish place: 8th International Conference on Political Science, International Relations and Transformation
Publish Year: 1400
نوع سند: مقاله کنفرانسی
زبان: English
View: 132
This Paper With 11 Page And PDF Format Ready To Download
- Certificate
- من نویسنده این مقاله هستم
استخراج به نرم افزارهای پژوهشی:
شناسه ملی سند علمی:
PSTCONF08_009
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 8 خرداد 1401
Abstract:
We provide evidence that power distribution seems to matter more than democratic electoral rules to form economic institutions. Our statistical strategy relies on a regime typology based on the status of power distribution; which might be centralized in the hands of the executive or decentralized and distributed among different political bodies such as the executive, legislature, etc. We show that decentralized regimes have better economic institutions than centralized ones, in both democracies and non-democracies. Moreover, democratic electoral rules by itself, may not be so important and interestingly, non-democracies with decentralized power have better economic institutions than democracies with centralized power
Keywords:
Authors
Reza Bakhshiani
Corresponding author: Graduate School of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology, Teimori Blvd., Habibolahi Ave., Azadi St., Tehran, Iran.
Masoud Nili
Graduate School of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology, Teimori Blvd.,Habibolahi Ave., Azadi St., Tehran, Iran
S. Mahdi Barakchian
Institute for Management and Planning Studies, No.۶, Shahid Mokhtar Asgary (Jamal Abad) St., North Niavaran St., Tehran, Iran